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INTRODUCTION
Santa Monica is committed to expanding affordable housing and helping
residents stay in their homes. The City has dedicated countless hours, as well as
millions of dollars, to preserving and producing housing within its roughly 8.3
square miles. Rising residential rents and real estate prices, however, have led
some to declare a “housing crisis” across Los Angeles County; and an everexpanding short-term rental industry creates new incentives for landlords to evade
rent control laws, evict tenants, and convert residential units into de facto hotels,
threatening also to undermine community ties in residential neighborhoods.
In this context, Santa Monica adopted the “Home-Sharing Ordinance” (the
“Ordinance”), which strikes a balance by allowing residents to supplement income
through home-sharing, inviting guests into a home for profit while the resident is
present, but prohibiting short-term vacation rentals where the resident is not
present in the home. The Ordinance also regulates “hosting platforms”, like
Appellants, who have contributed to the proliferation of illegal short-term vacation
rentals. The Ordinance prohibits any “hosting platform[]” from “complet[ing] any
booking transaction for any residential property or unit unless it is listed on the
City’s registry . . . at the time the hosting platform receives a fee for the booking
transaction.” Santa Monica Municipal Code (“SMMC”) 6.20.050(c), ER-34-35.
Appellants assert the Ordinance runs afoul of Section 230 of the
1
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Communications Decency Act because, “as a practical matter,” it “would compel
the platforms to remove third-party content to prevent their websites from
becoming littered with unbookable listings.” Appellant’s Opening Brief (“AOB”)
13 (emphasis in original). Two district courts have rejected this argument, properly
holding that Section 230 protects only publishing activity and the Ordinance
“creates no obligation on [Appellants’] part to monitor, edit, withdraw or block the
content supplied by hosts.” Excerpts of Record (“ER”) 3, 9-11; see also Airbnb,
Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 217 F.Supp.3d 1066, 1072-76 (N.D. Cal.
2016) (hereafter “Airbnb”).
Appellants further suggest that Section 230’s reach must be extended
because, absent protection, Appellants and their peers will be subject to
“idiosyncratic” or “numerous (and varied)” regulatory regimes. AOB-at 22.
Appellants’ interest in extending the reach of Section 230 is clear. Construed as
Appellants suggest, Section 230 would exempt online booking platforms from
virtually all regulation, granting additional competitive advantage to online
companies as compared to their brick-and-mortar counterparts and allowing online
businesses uniquely to write their own rules of conduct. A plain application of the
law, however, will not bring the result Appellants fear. That Congress did not draft
Section 230 to protect Appellants from penalties for unlawful financial transactions
does not mean that Congress could not; and Santa Monica, like other state and

2
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local governments, seeks constructive partnership, not unreasonableness, in
drafting its laws.
Because Appellants’ claims under the First Amendment and the California
Coastal Act also lack merit for the reasons set forth below, this Court should affirm
the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The City agrees with Appellants’ statement of jurisdiction.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Whether the district court appropriately exercised its discretion to deny a
preliminary injunction precluding enforcement of Santa Monica’s Home-Sharing
Ordinance (“the Ordinance”), where:
1.

It correctly held that the Ordinance regulates only non-publishing
conduct that falls outside the scope of any protection conferred by
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act;

2.

It correctly held that the Ordinance does not violate the First
Amendment because it imposes only incidental burdens on
commercial speech;

3.

It correctly determined that Appellants failed to meet their burden to
demonstrate a likelihood of success in their claim that the Ordinance

3
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conflicts with the California Coastal Act or required Coastal
Commission approval; and
4.

The balance of hardships and the public interest, factors not reached
by the district court, tip in the City’s favor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Santa Monica is a California municipality occupying slightly more than
eight square miles with a resident and visitor population of up to 500,000 people
daily. ER-19. A small city without room to expand, the City has consistently
dedicated policies and resources to promoting the preservation, production, and
affordability of housing, and protecting the quality and character of its residential
neighborhoods. See, e.g., ER-656, 662, 675-80, 692-693; see also Nash v. City of
Santa Monica, 37 Cal.3d 97, 100 (1984) (upholding City’s rent control ordinance
and describing “Demolition Derby” that resulted in City’s loss of over 1,300
residential units to condominium conversions during 15-month period in 1970s).
Consistent with its efforts to preserve and protect housing, the City has
prohibited short-term vacation rentals within its residential neighborhoods since at
least 1988. See discussion in Argument § III.B.1 below. Short-term rentals threaten
to reduce housing supply, particularly affordable housing, by converting residential
homes and apartments to tourist use. ER-1138, 1144-1145, 1148, 1151.
Additionally, the “‘residential character’ of a neighborhood is threatened when a
4
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significant number of homes . . . are occupied not by permanent residents but by a
stream of tenants staying a weekend, a week, or even 29 days, . . . [as] such rentals
undoubtedly affect the essential character of a neighborhood and the stability of a
community.” Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 234 Cal.App.3d 1579, 1591
(1991).
Appellants have been operating commercial online platforms facilitating
short-term rentals since 2006 and 2008. ER-1868 (HomeAway FAC ¶ 16); ER1836 (Airbnb FAC ¶ 27). Airbnb matches hosts and guests, completes booking
transactions for short-term rentals, and extracts a service fee from both hosts and
guests. ER-1837 (Airbnb FAC ¶ 29). Airbnb chooses not to charge for
advertisements, and instead to collect fees on booking transactions, because it
believes this business method to be more “convenient” for its users and more likely
to result in an increased number of transactions on which it may charge a
percentage. Id. HomeAway operates using two different business models: a payper-booking option (similar to Airbnb’s approach), or a subscription option under
which hosts pay HomeAway fees to list their units on HomeAway’s website. ER1869 (HomeAway FAC ¶ 21).
In May 2015, in the midst of a continuing statewide housing crisis
exacerbated by a burgeoning short-term rental industry, the Santa Monica City
Council reconsidered its longstanding prohibition on short-term rentals. Carefully

5
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weighing harms and benefits, the City adopted Ordinance 2484 which expressly
adopted and reaffirmed the City’s longstanding prohibition against “Vacation
Rentals,” defined as rentals of residential property for 31 consecutive days or less
in which residents do not remain within their units to host guests. Sections
6.20.010(c), 6.20.030; ER-22-23, 24. But it newly authorized “Home Sharing,”
allowing residents to host visitors for compensation for a period of less than thirtyone days, so long as residents obtain a business license and remain on-site
throughout the visitors’ stay. Sections 6.20.010(a), 6.20.020; ER-22-23; see also
ER-1058-1059, 1062, 1078. In this manner, Ordinance 2484 enabled residents to
supplement income to meet increased rents and housing prices, while it ensured
that Santa Monica’s housing units, and particularly affordable units, would not be
surreptitiously or openly converted into de facto hotels.
Two sections of Ordinance 2484 placed specific prohibitions or
responsibilities on online “hosting platforms” such as Appellants. See Section
6.20.010(b); ER-22 (defining “Hosting Platform”). Section 6.20.030 prohibited
hosting platforms from advertising, or assisting in advertising, vacation rentals or
unlawful home-sharing. ER-24. Section 6.20.050 required hosting platforms to: (1)
collect and remit applicable Transient Occupancy Tax; and (2) disclose on a
regular basis each home-sharing and vacation rental listing within the City,
together with certain information about each such listing and any bookings of those

6
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listings. Id.
Appellants filed challenges to Ordinance 2484. On September 21, 2016, the
parties agreed to stay the cases to allow the City to prepare and consider
amendments to Ordinance 2484 to address Appellants’ challenges. ER-1885 (Dkt.
21), ER-1900 (Dkt. No. 20).
During this period, Appellants were also challenging the City and County of
San Francisco’s short-term rental laws in the Northern District of California. On
November 8, 2016, District Judge James Donato issued a published opinion
finding that Appellants had established neither a likelihood of success on the
merits nor questions serious enough to require litigation, and denying Appellant’s
request for a preliminary injunction with respect to their CDA and First
Amendment challenges. Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1072-76 (CDA), 1076-79 (First
Amendment), 1080.1 Appellants appealed but then entered a public settlement in
which they agreed to comply with San Francisco’s laws and cease booking

1

On November 18, 2016, based on San Francisco’s acknowledgment that
“an effective registration verification procedure is not up and running,” the court
issued a temporary restraining order barring enforcement. ER-60-62. In issuing the
restraining order, the court reiterated its prior determination “that plaintiffs’ First
Amendment and CDA claims did not show a likelihood of success on the merits or
raise serious questions requirement more litigation,” and made clear that the
restraining order went “only to the serious questions relating to fair enforcement.”
ER-62. Here, to facilitate compliance and enforcement, the City publishes its
registry of licensed home-sharing hosts and their properties online. See SMMC §
6.20.020(b), ER-34; see also n.3 below.
7
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transactions with unregistered rental properties in San Francisco, subject to
enforcement procedures set forth in the settlement agreement. ER-64-78.
On January 24, 2017, Santa Monica adopted Ordinance 2535, which
amended Ordinance 2484 and SMMC Chapter 6.20 to limit their application to
hosting platforms such as Appellants in accordance with those aspects of the San
Francisco ordinance upheld in the Northern District of California. ER-29-39.
Ordinance 2484 as amended by Ordinance 2535 is codified at SMMC Chapter 6.20
and referred to herein as “the Ordinance.”
The Ordinance imposes obligations only on hosting platforms that
participate “in the home-sharing or vacation rental business by collecting or
receiving a fee, directly or indirectly through an agent or intermediary, for
conducting a booking transaction using any medium of facilitation.” SMMC
§6.20.010(c) (defining “Hosting Platform”), ER-32; see also ER-1313 (staff report
explaining amended ordinance would not regulate platforms that “do not charge for
booking services” but rather “act solely as publishers of advertisements for short
term rentals”).
The Ordinance imposes four obligations on this limited set of hosting
platforms: (1) to collect and remit applicable Transient Occupancy Tax; (2) to
disclose on a regular basis each home-sharing and vacation rental listing within the
City, together with certain information about each such listing and any bookings of

8
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those listings; (3) not to complete any booking transaction for any residential
property or unit unless it is listed on the City-created registry of validly licensed
home-sharing properties; and (4) not to collect any fees for facilitating or providing
services such as insurance, catering, entertainment, cleaning, property
management, or maintenance for any vacation rental or unregistered home-sharing
properties. SMMC §6.20.050, ER-34-35.
The Ordinance does not prohibit the publication of, or require the
monitoring or removal of, content provided to Appellants by third-party hosts.
Indeed, the Ordinance includes a “Safe Harbor” provision stating that any online
hosting platform that complies with the four responsibilities described above will
be presumed to be in compliance with the law, making clear that they could not be
held liable based on activities of hosts that may publish listings on their sites.
SMMC §6.20.050(e), ER-35. Nor does the Ordinance require hosting platforms to
engage in ongoing monitoring or verification of content provided by third-party
hosts. Rather, to facilitate compliance and enforcement, the City publishes its
registry of licensed home-sharing hosts and their properties online (see
https://data.smgov.net/Permits-Licenses/Home-Sharing-Registry/qza6-nc9s) where
it is readily available to Appellants. See SMMC §6.20.020(b), ER-34.
At the time of the hearing on their preliminary injunction motion,
Appellants continued to facilitate the majority of known short-term rentals—both
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lawful and unlawful—in Santa Monica. ER-1617 ¶ 5. The City has 196 licensed
home-sharing hosts, 90% of whom advertise on Appellants’ platforms. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.
In May 2017, one of Santa Monica’s peak tourist months, Airbnb had
approximately 950 short-term rental listings for Santa Monica, well in excess of
the number of licensed home-sharing properties. ER-1618 ¶ 8.2 Between
November 2015 and October 2017, Airbnb and its hosts collected approximately
$15.5 million a year from Santa Monica short-term rentals, the majority of which
operated without complying with the Ordinance. ER-1617-1618 ¶¶ 5, 8, 13.
As Appellants continue to receive a financial windfall by conducting
booking transactions for unlawful rentals in the City, the threat short-term rentals
pose to the City’s housing stock continues. ER-1625 ¶¶ 6, 7. Throughout
California, housing production has been outpaced by population growth, adding to
the housing affordability crisis. ER-1625 ¶ 8. The City has seen 2,272 rental
housing units withdrawn from the permanent rental market through the Ellis Act,
Cal. Gov’t Code §§7060 et seq., since 1986. ER-1613 ¶ 8. A disproportionate
number of removed units were in the City’s Coastal Zone. ER-1613 ¶ 9. It is
estimated that over 300 short-term rentals operated within rent-controlled units
between 2015-2017, increasing the concern that short-term rentals threaten a loss

2

Airbnb asserts that there are currently approximately 1,400 listings in Santa
Monica. ER-393 ¶ 15. The City has been unable to verify this number. ER-1618 ¶
12.
10
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of affordable rental units available to City residents. ER-1618 ¶ 11; ER-1625 ¶ 7.3
On December 13, 2017, Appellants moved for a preliminary injunction
arguing that the Ordinance violated the California Coastal Act, the CDA, and the
First Amendment. ER-1891 (Dkt. No. 57). On March 12, 2018, the district court
found no likelihood of success on the merits and denied Appellants’ motion. ER-112.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Unregulated short-term rentals seriously impact communities,
neighborhoods, and affordable housing stock in Santa Monica. In crafting a
legislative solution, the City sought to regulate hosting platforms that have
facilitated the proliferation of short-term rentals, and looked to the courts for
delineation of the boundaries of its authority under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). Judge Donato’s decision in Airbnb
recognized that local law could regulate hosting platforms’ own non-publishing
conduct, following an unbroken line of guidance from this Court. See Doe v.
Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016) (hereafter “Internet

3

Santa Monica is only one of many cities noting the deleterious effect
Appellants’ facilitation of home sharing has on communities, especially with
respect to permanent housing. See, e.g., Johanna Interian, Up in the Air:
Harmonizing the Sharing Economy Through Airbnb Regulations, 39 B.C. Int’l &
Comp. L. Rev. 129, 156–57 (2016).
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Brands”); Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n. 15 (9th Cir. 2008) (hereafter “Roommates.com”); Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009) (hereafter “Barnes”). The
Ordinance therefore unremarkably regulates non-publishing conduct (hosting
platforms’ facilitation and completion of booking transactions) while leaving
publishing conduct untouched. The Ordinance does not regulate platforms’
publication of listings at all and does not require platforms to screen, monitor, edit
or remove any listing, legal or illegal. Platforms simply may not take the additional
and affirmative step of brokering an illegal rental through their websites.
There is nothing too “creative,” “clever” or “backdoor” about the City
scrupulously following guidance from statutory text, as clarified by the courts.
AOB-at 1, 5, 25, 26. It is Appellants who seek to have this Court depart from its
prior precedent and create new law. Construed as expansively as Appellants
suggest, Section 230 would offer booking platforms virtually limitless protection
for all their activities, including non-publishing activities, so long as they could be
characterized as deriving from publishing activity “as a practical matter” or “in
effect.” See AOB-at 2, 23, 27. Congress did not draft Section 230 this broadly, and
this Court has squarely rejected such an expansive reading of its reach. See Internet
Brands, 824 F.3d at 853 (“CDA does not provide a general immunity against all
claims derived from third-party content”).

12
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Appellants’ First Amendment argument fails for similar reasons. The
Ordinance regulates Appellants’ commercial conduct (its participation in booking
transactions), not speech. And the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions
directed at commercial conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech,
particularly commercial speech promoting illegal commercial activity such as host
postings for illegal vacation rentals. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v.
Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980) (no
constitutional protection for “commercial speech related to illegal activity”).
Appellants’ California Coastal Act claim also fails. The Ordinance reflects a
balancing of interests entirely consistent with the multiple purposes of the Coastal
Act, is local land use legislation not subject to Coastal Commission review, and is
neither development nor an amendment to the City’s Land Use Plan that would
require approval by the Coastal Commission. The district court correctly concluded
that Appellants had failed to demonstrate any likelihood of success in this complex
area of state law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631,
635 (9th Cir. 2015). In deciding whether the district court abused its discretion, this
Court applies a two-part test: “first, determining whether the trial court identified
13
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the correct legal rule to apply to the requested relief and second, determining
whether the court’s application of that rule was illogical, implausible, or without
support from inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record.” Pacific
Radiation, 810 F.3d at 635. The district court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096,
1105 (9th Cir. 2012).
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy,” Munaf v.
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689 (2008), that should be entered only “upon a clear
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A party seeking a preliminary
injunction must show (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) it is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of
equities tips in its favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Pimentel,
670 F.3d at 1105. Likelihood of success on the merits is the most important of
these factors; “if a movant fails to meet this ‘threshold inquiry,’ the court need not
consider the other factors in the absence of ‘serious questions going to the merits.’”
Disney Enterprises v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations
omitted). Where questions go to the merits, a preliminary injunction may be
appropriate only if “the balance of hardships . . . tips sharply towards” it and the
other factors are satisfied. Id.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE ORDINANCE REGULATES NON-PUBLISHING CONDUCT,
OUTSIDE THE LIMITED PROTECTION PROVIDED BY SECTION
230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
Two federal district courts have found that a local law that holds Appellants

liable only “for their own conduct, namely for providing, and collecting a fee for,
Booking Services in connection with” unregistered or unlicensed units “does not
regulate what can or cannot be said or posted” and “creates no obligation on
plaintiffs’ part to monitor, edit, withdraw or block the content supplied by hosts.”
ER-10 (Order Denying Preliminary Injunction) (citing Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at
1072–73). These findings are entirely correct. The Ordinance prohibits only active
participation in illegal booking transactions, which is non-publishing conduct by
Appellants that falls outside the scope of Section 230 protection. Id.
A.

Section 230 Protection Is Expressly Limited to Publishing
Activities

Section 230 is “not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”
Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852-53; Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163. It is not
“an all-purpose get-out-of-jail-free card for businesses that publish user content on
the internet,” Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853, and it does not declare “a general
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immunity from liability deriving from third-party content.” Id. at 852 (quoting
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100); accord City of Chicago, Ill. v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d
363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Chicago”). Rather, the statute’s protection must be
limited to “its narrow language and its purpose.” Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853.
As this Court has repeatedly cautioned, “we must be careful not to exceed the
scope of the immunity provided by Congress.” Id. at 853 (quoting
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15).4
In construing a statute, courts “first look to the language of the statute to
determine whether it has a plain meaning.” Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
569 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2009). “The preeminent canon of statutory
interpretation requires us to presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there. Thus, our inquiry begins with the
statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” McDonald v. Sun
Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2008)(citation and internal quotation marks

Appellants’ cite Roommates.com as emphasizing Section 230’s “broad
grant” of immunity, and as a result holding that “close cases . . . must be resolved
in favor of immunity.” AOB-17. A partially concurring minority opinion, however,
took the majority to task for ostensibly upending “the settled view that interactive
service providers enjoy broad immunity.” 521 F.3d at 1176. And the statement that
close cases should be resolved in favor of immunity came in the context of
addressing whether the website’s actions should cause it to be treated as an
information content provider, 521 F.3d at 1174-75, a matter not at issue in this
appeal. See n.7 below. Moreover, as discussed below, that the Ordinance does not
penalize publishing activities is not a close question.
4
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omitted).
Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA states: “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” This Court held that the text
means what it says and protects from liability only: (1) “a provider or user of an
interactive computer service” (2) “whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law
cause of action, as a publisher or speaker” (3) “of information provided by another
information content provider.” Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 850 (quoting Barnes,
570 F.3d at 1100–01).5
The district courts in this case and Airbnb heeded this Court’s admonitions
in recognizing that the plain text of Section 230 protects online businesses from
liability arising from publishing activities, but nothing more. Appellants portray
both decisions as wrongly-decided outliers. AOB-39-423. But, both are

5

The City does not dispute that Appellants are providers of an interactive
computer service. Appellants argue that the third factor is also “indisputably met.”
AOB-16. In the district court, the City reserved its argument on this point (ER-618
n.7), and the court did not address it. Given this procedural posture, the City does
not here contend that the third prerequisite is absent because Appellants should be
considered “information content providers” under Section 230(f)(3). As in the
district court, the City reserves the right to develop the factual basis for and present
this argument in any other proceedings. See, e.g., Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d
1263, 1269 (9th Cir. 2016) (hereafter “Kimzey”) (“[C]ases establish that a website
may lose immunity under the CDA by making a material contribution into the
creation or development of content.”); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–68 (“[A]
website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to
section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”).
17
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straightforward applications of this Court’s precedent to nearly identical facts and
claims. As Airbnb explains, the cases cited by Appellants do not contradict Barnes,
Roommates.com, and Internet Brands, all of which instruct that the correct test is
“not whether a challenged activity merely bears some connection to online content;
[i]t is whether a regulation or claim ‘inherently requires the court to treat’ the
‘interactive computer service’ as a publisher or speaker of information provided by
another.” 217 F.Supp.3d at 1074 (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102); see also
Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 850. The district court in this case correctly followed
this precedent.
B.

The Ordinance Penalizes Only Non-Publishing Conduct Outside
of Section 230’s Limited Protection

The Ordinance was drafted to regulate Appellants’ activities in accordance
with the limits on Section 230’s protection recognized by this Court and others.
Accordingly, the Ordinance prohibits and penalizes only non-publishing conduct:
platforms direct activity conducting commercial booking transactions for
unlicensed short-term rentals.
This Court has defined publication activities protected by Section 230 as
involving “reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw
from publication third-party content.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102; see also Internet
Brands, 824 F.3d at 852 (“efforts, or lack thereof, to edit, monitor, or remove user
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generated content”); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1170-71 (“any activity that can
be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to
post online”); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (“exercising the
usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material.”).6 The district
court correctly found that the Ordinance penalizes no such publication activities
because it “creates no obligation on [Appellants’] part to monitor, edit, withdraw
or block the content supplied by hosts.” ER-10 (quoting Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at
1072-73).
Appellants argue that the district court was incorrect, and that the Ordinance
requires them to monitor, review, and remove third-party listings. AOB-at 18, 21,
22-24. Though they do not contend that the Ordinance on its face requires any of
these actions, Appellants make two arguments to support their claim.
First, Appellants contend that the City “admits” that the Ordinance requires

6

Other courts have similarly described publishing activity as involving
decisions about what third-party content may be posted online. See, e.g., Jones v.
Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“publisher’s traditional editorial functions – such as deciding whether to publish,
withdraw, postpone, or alter content”) (quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (“making the decision whether to print or retract a given piece of
content”); Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413,
422 (1st Cir. 2007) (“decision not to reduce misinformation [contained in thirdparty postings] by changing its web site policies”); Green v. America Online, 318
F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (“monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from
its network”).
19
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them “to monitor and review third-party content” and that this admission is “fatal”
to the City’s position. AOB-at 21. To support this argument, Appellants cite a
sentence from the City’s briefing below: “True, in order to provide booking
services in connection with a unit, Plaintiffs will have to determine whether the
unit is properly licensed for rental.” ER-617 (cited in AOB-at 18). That sentence
says nothing about monitoring and reviewing third-party listings. It is contained
within a paragraph that begins: “The Home-Sharing ordinance also does not
require Plaintiffs to monitor and review listings.” Id. Given the context, there is no
basis for the claim that the cited sentence constitutes an admission by the City that
the Ordinance requires monitoring and review of third-party listings. Indeed, at the
City’s urging, the district court expressly found to the contrary. ER-3, 10.7
Second, Appellants contend that, “effectively,” the only way to comply with
the Ordinance is to “scrutinize third-party listings to determine whether the listed
properties appear on the Santa Monica registry” and then remove or refuse to

7

Relying on a series of cases criticizing and disregarding civil plaintiffs’
efforts at “creative pleading in an effort to work around” Section 230 protections,
Appellants contend the Ordinance’s express limitations to booking transactions
should similarly be disregarded. AOB-at 24-25 & n.4, 28. This argument is
unfounded. The City made no secret of its desire to regulate Appellants’ activities,
and so limit their transactions facilitating illegal home-sharing, to the extent
permitted under Section 230 and other law. The City’s modification of the
Ordinance to accord with the San Francisco law upheld against a CDA challenge is
neither “disingenuous” nor an example of “artful pleading” that should be
disregarded. Instead, it is a valid effort to conform regulation to existing law.
20
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accept those that do not appear on the registry. AOB-at 21, 23. Appellants cite to
two declarations submitted by Airbnb’s Head of Policy Strategy (ER-395) and a
HomeAway Vice President (ER-504). See AOB-at 21, 23. Both make clear that the
referenced scrutiny could occur “after publication but prior to processing the
payment and transaction for the listing.” ER-395; see also ER-504. Moreover,
given Santa Monica’s public posting of its registry of licensed home-sharers,
which lists property addresses, all Appellants would need to do, at the time of a
proposed booking transaction, is compare the address of the proposed booking
with the online registry to confirm that the property is registered. This limited
check relates to a decision not whether to remove posted listings, but instead
whether to proceed with a booking transaction; it therefore does not constitute
publishing activity protected by Section 230.
Both declarations assert that for business reasons, Appellants do not find
viable the option of checking addresses against the registry at the time of the
booking transaction, and would instead likely comply either by monitoring and
screening listings prior to publication, removing those listings not on the registry,
or by ceasing to operate in Santa Monica. ER-395; ER-504. Appellants argue this
establishes they have no choice but to engage in review and removal if they are to
avoid liability, citing National Meat Association v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012).
AOB-at 26-27. That case generally instructs that preemption analysis may include
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the “practical effect” of a challenged law. Appellant’s similar contention regarding
the San Francisco ordinance was squarely rejected. See Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at
1074-75. The reasons cited by the San Francisco court apply here as well: there are
options for compliance other than review and removal; National Meat involved a
statute under which preemption is different from and potentially much broader than
under the CDA, particularly given this Court’s express caution against applying
CDA protection “beyond its narrow language and its purpose,” Internet Brands,
824 F.3d at 853; and cases that have construed National Meat in other contexts
have limited it to its particular facts.8
Complying with the ordinance through independent, post-publication checks
in connection with authorizing booking transactions may impose costs, whether
directly by causing Appellants to expend funds to modify their software and
implement procedures for these checks, or indirectly by affecting Appellants’
relationships with hosts or vacation renters who are upset when they find
themselves unable to complete illegal booking transactions through Appellants’

8

Appellants also cite Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel Johnson, 568 U.S. 627 (2013).
AOB-25-26, 27. The San Francisco court’s reasons for distinguishing National
Meat apply equally to Wos, which relied on National Meat to preempt a North
Carolina statute that, in certain circumstances, operated “to allow the State to take
one-third of the total recovery, even if a proper stipulation or judgement attributes
a smaller percentage to medical expenses,” thus creating a direct “conflict”
between “North Carolina’s law and the Medicaid anti-lien provision,” which
limited liens to actual recoveries of medical expenses. Wos, 568 U.S. at 638.
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sites. Such costs are a common result of regulatory compliance. E.g., United States
v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 883 (1996) (“all regulations have their costs”).
Appellants’ declarations state that given the indirect regulatory costs, Appellants
are likely, for business reasons, to pursue a different method of compliance,
monitoring and removing illegal listings before booking transactions are attempted
and aborted. Such a voluntary choice to engage in publishing activity as a means of
minimizing regulatory costs does not convert the Ordinance into one that targets or
requires that publishing activity.
Moreover, extending CDA protection based on the costs of regulatory
compliance would give Appellants an unjustified business advantage over potential
competitors. The Ordinance applies to all hosting services, whether online or not.
SMMC 6.20.010(b), ER-32. Expanding CDA protection based on Appellants’
desire to avoid regulatory costs would improperly carve out favorable treatment for
them, as online companies, that booking service providers not based on the Internet
would not enjoy. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15 (CDA immunity
should not be applied to “give online businesses an unfair advantage over their
real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of general applicability”).
Such a competitive advantage would be particularly unwarranted given the
internet’s status as “the dominant -- perhaps the preeminent -- means through
which commerce is conducted.” Id.
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C.

The Cases on Which Appellants Rely Simply Confirm that
Section 230 Protection Is Limited to Publishing Activities

This Court has consistently declined to extend Section 230 protection
beyond publication activities. In Internet Brands, this Court held a website could
be liable for failing to warn users regarding a serial rapist it knew was using the
website to hunt potential victims. 824 F.3d at 851. Section 230 did not immunize
the website because the plaintiff did not seek to hold Internet Brands liable as a
“publisher or speaker,” but rather for its own non-publishing conduct. Id. In
Barnes, for similar reasons, this Court concluded that the CDA did not preclude
liability against Yahoo! for a breach of its promise to remove nude photographs
from its website. 570 F.3d at 1107.
Other Courts similarly have recognized that liability based on nonpublishing conduct—distinct from acts of publishing—is not entitled to Section
230 protection. For example, in Chicago, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether
Section 230 prevented the City of Chicago from imposing a tax on Internet auction
sites. 624 F.3d at 365. The court concluded that Section 230 was “irrelevant”
because Chicago’s “tax does not depend on who ‘publishes’ any information or is a
‘speaker’.” Id. at 366. The tax liability was imposed based on StubHub’s conduct
(Internet auction transactions) and had nothing to do with whether or how an
auction offer was published. Appellants attempt to distinguish this case because it
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“involved tax collection, not reviewing, monitoring, or removing, third-party
content.” AOB-at 30 n. 6. But that is precisely the point: the internet sites could
avoid Chicago’s tax liability by ceasing to conduct auction transactions without
regard to who was the publisher or speaker of the auction listings, just as
Appellants can avoid liability by ceasing to conduct booking transactions for
illegal home-shares without regard to who is the publisher or speaker of homesharing listings. The publication of postings for sale of tickets (on StubHub) or
postings for short-term rentals (on Appellants’ sites) is entirely separate. Like
Chicago, this case does not involve any required review and removal of postings.9
Appellants rely on a litany of federal and state cases that have found Section
230 protection. AOB-17, 19 n.2, 20 n.3. All, however, “involved claims and
regulations that would have imposed liability on the service provider as a publisher
or speaker of content supplied by a third party.” Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1073.10

9

Other examples include Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., 194 F.Supp.3d 959, 967
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (Section 230 does not bar claim premised on Twitter’s
redistribution, through automatic telephone dialing system, of unwanted messages
to consumers in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act because
claim “does not depend on the content of any tweet, or on any assertion that
Twitter is required to sift through content to make sure the content is not bad”) and
Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1263 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (liability is
premised not on content of third-party created profiles but on “manner” of
distribution of those profiles).
10

The San Francisco district court distinguished Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC,
817 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2016) (challenge to website features that “reflect choices
about what content can appear on the website and in what form” which “are
25
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Appellants contend that the decisions upholding Santa Monica’s and San
Francisco’s ordinances rely on a distinction between websites that engage in
commerce and those that do not. AOB-at 28. They neither draw nor require any

editorial choices that fall within the purview of traditional publisher functions”);
Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F.Supp.2d 805, 824 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (“sale
of online advertisements” “derives from a website’s status and conduct as an
online publisher of classified advertisements”); Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna,
881 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1273 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (Washington state law imposed
criminal liability on websites for “publishing, disseminating, or displaying”
information “created by third parties -- namely ads for commercial sex acts
depicting minors”); and Goddard v. Google, No. C 08-2738 JF (PVT), 2008 WL
5245490 at *1, *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (plaintiff sought to hold Google liable
for fraud committed by third-party advertisers). Other cases cited by Appellants are
similarly distinguishable because they involved claims premised on websites’
permitting to be posted or failing to remove third-party generated content. See
Jones, 755 F.3d at 408-17 (defamation claims based on third party postings); Doe
v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (claims alleging negligent
failure to implement safety measures to protect minors are “merely another way of
claiming that MySpace was liable for publishing” online third-party generated
content); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108, 1118-1119 (9th Cir.
2007) (state law unfair competition and false advertising claims based on posting
of images stolen from magazine and website); Green v. America Online, Inc., 318
F.3d at 465 (3d Cir. 2003) (claim asserting AOL negligence in “promulgating
harmful content and in failing to address certain harmful content on its network” is
attempt to “hold AOL liable for decisions relating to the monitoring, screening,
and deletion of content from its network – actions quintessentially related to a
publisher’s role”); Pennie v. Twitter, 281 F.Supp.3d 874, 889-90 (N.D. Cal. 2017),
appeal filed, No. 17-17536 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2017) (material support claims based
on Twitter’s provision of accounts to Hamas -- “Plaintiffs explicitly base their
claims on the content that Hamas allegedly posts” and “Defendants could only
determine which accounts are affiliated with Hamas by reviewing the content
published by those accounts”); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735 (RMB),
2009 WL 1704355 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (“alleged failure to block,
screen, or otherwise prevent the dissemination of a third party’s content, i.e., the
gun advertisement in question”).

26

Case: 18-55367, 05/16/2018, ID: 10875459, DktEntry: 30, Page 39 of 74

such distinction. Monetizing online activity is not itself a reason to deny Section
230 protection; rather, a platform operates outside the scope of that limited
protection when it engages in activity that is not publishing activity. The cases
cited by Appellants (AOB-29 n.5) first found that Section 230 protection existed in
the first place, generally because each case addressed liability claims predicated on
what were publishing activities; and only then held that a platform’s commercial
profit from such publishing activities did not defeat Section 230’s otherwise
applicable protection.11
Stoner v. eBay, Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL 1705637 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1,
2000), and Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. 227 (2012) -- state cases that
neither carry precedential weight here nor were controlled by this Court’s

11

See Hinton v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 72 F.Supp.3d 685, 690 (S.D. Miss.
2014) (claims arise from publication of third-party information because Plaintiffs’
central allegation is that eBay permitted retailer “to advertise and sell the
aforementioned recalled product to the Plaintiff through a listing on its auction
website” after eBay knew or should have known of the recall); Evans v. HewlettPackard Co., No. C 13-02477 WHA, 2013 WL 5594717 at *3-*4 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
10, 2013) (state law claims based on content of app posted for sale by third party);
Inman v. Technicolor USA, Inc., Civil Action No. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024, at
*2, *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011) (where eBay was “not involved in the actual
transaction between buyers and sellers,” alleged sale of vacuum tubes “was
facilitated by communication for which eBay may not be held liable under the
CDA”); Milgram v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 419 N.J. Super. 305, 324 (Law. Div.
2010) (online ticket broker protected by CDA because not responsible “for the
creation or development of the alleged inaccurate or misleading ticket listings”
posted by third-parties); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090,
1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (no dispute that state law claims rested on Amazon’s
publishing activities, and images at issue were provided by third-party vendors).
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precedents -- are not to the contrary. Stoner, an unpublished California superior
court opinion decided without the guidance of this Court’s subsequent decisions in
Roommates.com, Barnes, and Internet Brands limiting the scope of Section 230’s
protection, involved claims brought under California’s Unfair Competition Law
alleging that eBay sold or caused the sale of “bootleg” recordings. Hill, a North
Carolina Court of Appeals case, rejected a ticket buyer’s attempt to hold StubHub
responsible for a ticket seller’s violation of a North Carolina anti-scalping law.
Both courts determined that the plaintiffs’ claims were predicated on content
provided by and liability directed at the seller. Stoner, WL 1705637 at *3; Hill, 219
N.C. App. at 248-49. In contrast, the Ordinance does not impose liability on
platforms based on content provided by short-term rental hosts; and neither Stoner
nor Hill extended CDA protection to a law expressly limited to online brokers
directly participating in illegal commercial booking transactions.
Appellants point to three cases in which courts have found Section 230 to
protect them specifically, but these cases are merely in line with the many that hold
Section 230 precludes liability premised on failure to remove third-party postings.
See MDA City Apartments, LLC v. Airbnb, Inc., 2018 WL 910831 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
2018) (MDA alleged that “Airbnb Defendants can be held liable because the
complained of listings are unlawful since they advertise rentals that violate the
terms of MDA’s leases” and “Defendants have failed to remove such listings”);
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Hiam v. Homeaway.com, Inc., 267 F.Supp.3d 338, 348 (D. Mass. 2017) (Section
230 precludes liability for “misleading or inaccurate material” posted by
Homeaway.com’s customers); Donaher v. Vannini, No. CV-16-0213, 2017 WL
4518378 at *2 (Me. Super. Aug. 18, 2017) (“At the heart of plaintiff’s claims
against Airbnb is their allegation that Airbnb failed to take down Vannini and
Macri’s post offering plaintiff’s house [that they did not own] for rent on Airbnb’s
website. A decision not to delete a particular posting is an editorial decision.”).
Appellants also rely on La Park LaBrea A LLC, et al. v. Airbnb, Inc., et al.,
285 F.Supp.3d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2017), appeal filed, No. 18-55113 (Jan. 26, 2018),
which is almost identical to MDA City Apartments. In La Park LaBrea, the district
court neither questioned nor disagreed with the San Francisco court’s ruling in
Airbnb, instead distinguishing it by noting allegations in the complaint before it
regarding Airbnb’s refusal to remove listings and continuing “to allow the listing
to persist.” 285 F.Supp.3d at 1108. The court followed the San Francisco court in
recognizing that “the correct test for CDA protection ‘is not whether a challenged
activity merely bears some connection to online content’ but whether the claim
‘inherently requires the court to treat the “interactive computer service” as a
publisher or speaker of information provided by another.’” Id. (quoting Airbnb,
217 F.Supp.3d at 1074). Relying on the particular allegations in the complaint, the
court concluded that the claims before it satisfied this test. It is utterly
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unremarkable that the courts in these cases found Section 230 protection to apply,
just as it is utterly unhelpful to the present case.12
Appellants cannot seriously dispute that Section 230 protection has limits.
This Court has plainly defined those limits, applying Section 230 protection only to

Appellants note that certain courts, “led by the First Circuit,” have applied
Section 230 protection to “a website’s ‘overall design and operation’ with respect
to third-party content, including features related to payment services.” AOB-30.
The approach of these courts is consistent with this Circuit’s holdings regarding
the limits on Section 230 protection because they too require a connection between
a website’s “overall design and operation” and publishing activities related to
third-party content. Thus, for example, in Doe v. Backpage, the First Circuit
applied Section 230 protection to claims premised in part on design features
alleged to encourage sex trafficking (including allowing third-party posters to pay
anonymously for their actual posts) because those features reflected “choices about
what content can appear on the website and in what form” which “are editorial
choices that fall within the purview of traditional publisher functions.” 817 F.3d at
20-21. Similarly, the two other cases cited by Appellants involved websites’
operational decisions (whether to allow members of ISIS and Hamas to obtain and
use accounts) that related directly to whether or not to allow particular third-party
content to be posted, again, a traditional publishing function. See Fields v. Twitter,
Inc., 217 F.Supp.3d 1116, 1123-24 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff'd on other grounds, 881
F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018) (decision to decline to furnish account to particular user
based on apparent ISIS affiliation would be “a publishing decision to prohibit the
public dissemination of these ideas”); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F.Supp.3d
140, 156-58 (E.D.N.Y 2017), motion to reconsider denied, Force v. Facebook,
Inc., 2018 WL 472807 at *4, *10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2018), appeal filed, No. 18397 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 2018) (Facebook’s choices as to who (including Hamas) may
use its platform and associated services “are inherently bound up in its decisions as
to what may be said on its platform, and so liability imposed based on its failure to
remove users would equally derive[] from [Facebook’s] status or conduct as a
publisher or speaker”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). None of these
cases raised or resolved the question posed here: whether Section 230 protects
platforms from a law prohibiting the completion of a financial transaction for an
unlawful activity.
12
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publishing activities and refusing to apply it simply because a challenged activity
“bears some connection to online content.” Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.2d at 1072; see
also Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100. As this court has observed, “[p]ublishing activity is
a but-for cause of just about everything [Appellants are] involved in. [They are]
internet publishing business[es]. Without publishing user content, [they] would not
exist. As noted above, however, we held in Barnes that the CDA does not provide
a general immunity against all claims derived from third-party content.” Internet
Brands, 824 F.3d at 853. Appellants’ booking transactions that are the object of the
Ordinance are not publishing activity, and therefore fall outside the limits of
Section 230 protection.
D.

Appellants’ Argument Based on “Obstacle Preemption” Is
Misplaced and Unpersuasive

Appellants attempt to separate Congressional intent from Section 230’s text
by making an argument based on “obstacle preemption.” AOB-at 32-39. But
“federalism requires that we assume federal law was not intended to supersede the
states’ historic police powers ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” Arellano v. Clark County Collection Service, LLC, 875 F.3d 1213,
1216 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, courts “read even express preemption provisions
narrowly,” using as the “ultimate touchstone” the actual purpose of Congress. Id. at
1216-17.
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Congressional intent in enacting section 230 is well-established--to
“promote the free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet,” Carafano
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003), protect internet
service providers from liability for “other parties’ potentially injurious messages,”
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31, and “encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or
obscene material.” Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122. These concerns are affirmed by
Section 230(c)’s title, “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of
offensive material,” which this Court has opined reflects intent not to protect
internet operators engaged in commercial, transactional activities in flagrant
disregard of the law, but rather to allow and encourage online providers to act
voluntarily as publishers without fear of liability to take steps to ferret out
defamatory or otherwise unlawful speech. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163-64.
These speech and information-based concerns are reiterated in Congressional
findings in Section 230(a). See 47 U.S.C. §230(a). In accord with these findings
regarding the potential political, educational, and informational benefits of the
then-nascent internet, Congress stated its policy goals of promoting “the continued
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services” and
preserving “the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.” 47 U.S.C. §230(b).
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Congress nowhere articulated a policy or intent to exempt online service
providers engaged in non-publishing activity from reasonable regulation of that
activity simply because it takes place, or is based on information posted, on the
Internet. 13 Nor has this Circuit succumbed to online businesses’ attempts to expand
the law to that effect:
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of
communication that could easily be smothered in the
cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations
applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has
become a dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means
through which commerce is conducted. And its vast reach
into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful
not to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by
Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair
advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must
comply with laws of general applicability.
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15. If completing an illegal booking
transaction “is prohibited when practiced in person or by telephone, [there is] no
reason why Congress would have wanted to make it lawful to profit from it

Filing as an amicus on behalf of Appellants, former Congressman
Christopher Cox cites both his personal motivations and his floor statements in the
debate over Section 230’s adoption as support for extending it to preclude the
Ordinance’s application to Appellants. E.g., Cox Amicus Brief at 4-5, 9, 10.
Former congressman Cox’s statements in his amicus brief are entitled to no
independent weight in interpreting Congress’s legislative intent in adopting the
CDA. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
118 (1980) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979)) (“even the
contemporaneous remarks of a single legislator who sponsors a bill are not
controlling in analyzing legislative history”).
13
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online.” Id. at 1167. Unlawful commercial transactions “don’t magically become
lawful when [conducted] electronically online.” Id.
Online businesses have engaged in a thoughtful, concerted campaign to
expand the reach of Section 230 protection. Their attempts to rewrite
Congressional intent using judicial dicta accumulated over the two decades since
enactment must be rejected. Batzel, for example, is frequently cited by Appellants
for its brief statements that a purpose of Section 230 was to “promote the
development of e-commerce” and that Congress sought to advance “e-commerce
interests on the Internet.” See AOB-at 3, 29-30, 32, 34, 39. But commercial, nonpublishing activity was not at issue or even considered in Batzel, which reviewed
denial of an anti-SLAPP motion and underlying defamation claims.
Moreover, Appellant’s arguments in this regard have no limiting principle
and rest on a fundamentally invalid assumption, namely, that regulations such as
the Ordinance “purport[] to regulate transactions as a way to regulate content sub
rosa.” AOB-at 37. Under this approach, any regulation addressing any
transactional activity dependent on a third-party posting would arguably fall within
Section 230’s protection. This Court has expressly rejected this broad an approach.
See Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853 (not enough that action as “publisher or
speaker” of user content is “but-for” cause of conduct resulting in liability because
“CDA does not provide a general immunity against all claims derived from third-
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party content” and court must “be careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity
provided by Congress”); see also Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171 (“[p]roviding
immunity every time a website uses data initially obtained from third parties would
eviscerate the exception to section 230 for ‘develop[ing]’ unlawful content ‘in
whole or in part.’”) (citation omitted). Such a broad approach is similarly
precluded by the plain text of Section 230, which, as this Court has repeatedly
recognized, squarely limits the scope of the statutory protection to publishing
activities, not transactional activities of the type regulated by the Ordinance.14
II.

THE ORDINANCE COMPORTS WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The district court correctly determined that the Ordinance comports with the

First Amendment. By prohibiting illegal booking transactions for unlicensed shortterm rentals, the Ordinance “regulates conduct, not speech.” ER-11. Any incidental
burden on speech does not trigger First Amendment protection, as “restrictions on
protected expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more

The validity of this distinction, and the absence of limits on Appellants’
contrary position, are demonstrated by Doe v. Backpage, in which the court
extended Section 230 protection to design features alleged to encourage sex
trafficking, including allowing third-party posters to pay anonymously for their
actual posts, because those features reflected “choices about what content can
appear on the website and in what form.” 817 F.3d at 20-21. Appellants’ position
would extend the protection even further, to a website’s participation in booking
(and taking a percentage of the booking payment for) sex acts arising from the
posts.
14
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generally, on nonexpressive conduct,” and “the First Amendment does not prevent
restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on
speech.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011). In any event, the
Ordinance is narrowly drawn to advance the City’s significant government
interests in preserving long-term housing, reducing evictions, and preserving the
character and quality of life of Santa Monica’s residential neighborhoods.
A.

The Home-Sharing Ordinance Targets Conduct, Not Speech

As two district courts have now concluded, “[a] booking transaction as
defined and targeted by the Ordinance is a business transaction to secure a shortterm rental, not conduct with any significant expressive element.” ER-11; Airbnb,
217 F.Supp.3d at 1076. By restricting such business transactions, the Ordinance
neither restricts conduct “with a ‘significant expressive element’” nor “has the
inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in expressive activity.” 217
F.Supp.3d at 1076 (quoting International Franchise Association v. City of Seattle,
803 F.3d 389, 408 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ordinance, put simply, “is directed at
specific business transactions and practices, and ‘not to any message the businesses
express.’” Id. at 1077 (quoting International Franchise, 803 F.3d at 409).
Appellants’ attempt to blur this distinction by positioning themselves not as
commercial operators but as traditionally protected First Amendment speakers and
publishers. AOB-43-44. But Appellants are not news organizations, and the
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Ordinance has not imposed a tax on the very paper and ink with which they speak.
See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585 (1983) (use tax on paper and ink that applied to only small number of
newspapers was impermissible and implicated area where “First Amendment has
its ‘fullest and most urgent’ application”); Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 109
(3d Cir. 2004) (state statute prohibiting college newspapers from receiving
payment for alcoholic beverage advertising violated First Amendment by imposing
“special financial burdens on . . . a narrow sector of the media”). Appellants’
attempt to invoke the First Amendment protections accorded individuals engaged
in door-to-door solicitation of charitable contributions, is similarly unavailing. See
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632
(1980) (charitable appeals for funds are “characteristically intertwined with
informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or
for particular views on economic, political, or social issues” and “[c]anvassers in
such contexts are necessarily more than solicitors for money”).
Appellants rely largely on Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), and Sorrell, to contend that the district
court failed to consider the second half of the International Franchise test, namely,
whether the “ordinance has the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in
expressive activity.” AOB-at 42-44 & n.15. But the laws in those cases targeted
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expressive activity, not unlawful financial transactions. As Judge Donato
explained, the New York “Son of Sam” law at issue in Simon & Schuster, Inc., by
“restricting a criminal’s right to profit from literary or other works based on [a]
crime,” “singled out income derived from classically ‘expressive activity’ (e.g.,
books, movies, magazines articles, or other ‘expression[s] of [an] accused or
convicted person’s thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions’ about the crime), and
was directed only at ‘works with a specified content’ (i.e., relating to the
‘reenactment of [the] crime’).” Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1077 (quoting Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 110, 116). Similarly, the Vermont statute at issue in
Sorrell created content and speaker-based restrictions that could not withstand First
Amendment scrutiny because the law “on its face ‘disfavor[ed] marketing, that is,
speech with a particular content,’ and ‘more than that, . . . disfavor[ed] specific
speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.’” Id. (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at
564). As Judge Donato correctly recognized, Simon & Schuster and Sorrell
involved “core First Amendment concerns . . . not implicated by the Ordinance
here.” Id. at 1077.
The district court therefore properly concluded that the Ordinance, like San
Francisco’s before it, “does not implicate expressive activity or speech.” ER-12;
see also Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1077.
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B.

Any Incidental Burden Falls On Commercial Advertisements For
Unlawful Activity Not Subject To First Amendment Protection

Appellants argue that the “conduct/speech distinction” so firmly rooted in
First Amendment law will “allow the government to ban a wide swath of otherwise
protected speech, especially on the internet.” AOB-at 46. This presents no such
threat. “To the limited extent the Ordinance might be said to affect speech, the
impact or burden is purely incidental” and “involves speech that ‘does no more
than propose a commercial transaction.’” Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1078 (quoting
Lone Star Security and Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 827 F.3d 1192, 1198 n.3
(9th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted)).
First Amendment concerns are even more lacking where the commercial
speech on which any incidental impact falls relates to unlawful activity. “Any First
Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial
proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting
the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and
the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic
activity.” Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973). Put more succinctly, commercial speech that proposes an
illegal transaction is excluded from First Amendment protection. See United States
v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (“offers to give or receive what it is
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unlawful to possess have no social value and thus, like obscenity, enjoy no First
Amendment protection”); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64 (1980) (no
constitutional protection for “commercial speech related to illegal activity”).
Appellants argue that the Ordinance requires them to “‘investigate the
advertisements they print,’ raising the risk that commercial speech will be
‘impermissibly chill[ed].’” AOB-at 47 (quoting Braun v. Soldier of Fortune
Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1119 (11th Cir. 1992)). The Ordinance requires no
such thing. As the district courts found, the Ordinance targets a business
transaction -- completion of a booking transaction for an unlicensed and therefore
unlawful rental -- and “does not limit [Appellants’] ability to publish
advertisements for rentals that may violate the Ordinance” or require Appellants to
“edit, withdraw, or block the content supplied by hosts.” ER-10, 11; see also
Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1078.15

Contrary to Appellants’ claim (AOB-at 47), where a burden falls only
incidentally on advertisements, those advertisements need not be “unlawful on
their face” to ameliorate any First Amendment concerns. Pittsburgh Press itself
addressed a situation where the “illegality” posed by the advertisements at issue
was “less overt” -- they were not want ads “proposing a sale of narcotics or
soliciting prostitutes,” but instead want ads for nonexempt employment placed in
columns headed with the gender of the applicants being sought. 413 U.S. at 38889. In any event, unlike both Pittsburgh Press and Braun (the case on which
Appellants primarily rely), where the publication of advertisements was itself the
conduct giving rise to liability, here the Ordinance penalizes not the publication of
advertisements (the home-share postings) but participation in subsequent booking
transactions.
15
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C.

The Ordinance Is Narrowly Tailored To Serve A Substantial
Government Interest

Under Central Hudson, actual restrictions on commercial speech promoting
lawful transactions, even if content-based, need only withstand intermediate
scrutiny, that is, the restriction “must directly advance” a “substantial state
interest” and must be “narrowly drawn” to “extend only as far as the interest it
serves.” 447 U.S. at 564-65; see also Lone Star, 827 F.3d at 1198 n.3. Even were
the Ordinance a content-based restriction, it would survive this scrutiny. It is a
balanced local law that is narrowly drawn to advance substantial government
interests in protecting affordable housing and preserving residential neighborhoods
by preventing home-sharing or vacation rental from converting residential homes
and apartments into de facto hotels.16
The Ordinance is not, however, a content-based restriction on commercial
speech, but rather a lawful restriction of purely commercial conduct with, at most,

Appellants take issue not with the validity of the asserted interest, but with
the Ordinance’s tailoring to serve that interest. In particular, Appellants assert that
the Ordinance is under-inclusive because it does not apply to online bulletin board
sites like Craigslist that “advertise the very same properties but have no booking
functionality.” AOB-50. This limit on the Ordinance’s reach is the result of efforts
to avoid potential conflict with Section 230. The City’s efforts to comply with
Section 230 cannot be a basis for arguing, as Appellants do, that the Ordinance’s
“under-inclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact
pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker.” AOB50 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
16
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incidental effects on commercial advertisements for unlawful transactions. “Every
civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First Amendment
protected activities.” Arcara v Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986). The
Ordinance falls well within the sphere of permissibility by penalizing only
unlawful, non-expressive financial transactions in service of substantial
governmental interests.
D.

The Ordinance Does Not Impose Strict Liability

Appellants argue that the Ordinance also violates the First Amendment
because it imposes “criminal penalties on publishers without any mens rea
requirement.” AOB-at 51. This argument should be rejected for three reasons.
First, for all the reasons discussed above, the Ordinance imposes liability on
Appellants, not as publishers, but for engaging in and collecting fees for unlawful
booking transactions and therefore penalizes only non-expressive commercial
conduct. Second, the Ordinance itself contains narrowing provisions. See SMMC
6.20.050(e) (“Safe Harbor”), (f) (“provisions of this section shall be interpreted in
accordance with otherwise applicable state and federal law(s)”), ER-35. Finally,
the California Supreme Court reads scienter into statutes with criminal penalties,
see, e.g., Stark v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.4th 368, 393 (2011); People v. Salas, 37
Cal.4th 967, 978 (2006), and the City stated in the district court that it would
accept imputation of a scienter requirement here. ER-620; see also Airbnb., 217
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F.Supp.3d at 1079-80 (noting that San Francisco accepted “imputation of a scienter
requirement”).
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED AN INJUNCTION
BASED ON APPELLANTS’ CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT CLAIM
The district court properly determined that Appellants failed to meet their

burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on their pendent state law claim
under the California Coastal Act of 1976, Cal. Pub. Res. Code (“CPRC”) §30000
et seq. (the “Coastal Act”). The Coastal Act does not preempt the police powers of
California municipalities absent a clear conflict. Id. §30005(a), (b); see also Cal.
Const., Art. XI §7 (municipalities may make and enforce “all local, police,
sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws”).
Rather, the Coastal Act provides the California Coastal Commission (“Coastal
Commission”) with limited powers, namely, authority to review and certify a local
land use plan (“LUP”), review and certify a local coastal program (“LCP”) and
subsequent amendments thereto, and (in the absence of a certified LCP, as in Santa
Monica’s case) grant or deny Coastal Development Permits (“CDPs”) for
development within the Coastal Zone. See CPRC §§30512, 30512.2, 30513,
30600. These enumerated powers are the full extent of the Commission’s relevant
authority within the City’s Coastal Zone. See Ibarra v. California Coastal
Comm’n, 182 Cal.App.3d 687, 696 (1986) (Commission’s “primary duties under
43
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the coastal act are to grant or deny permits for coastal development . . . . and
approve or disapprove [LCPs]”).
The Ordinance is a lawful exercise of municipal legislative authority,
consistent with the stated purposes of the Coastal Act, and not procedurally subject
to Coastal Commission review. Moreover, even if there were a significant issue as
to the merits of Appellants’ pendent Coastal Act claim, an injunction based on that
claim could apply to only the 18 percent of Santa Monica that lies within the
Coastal Zone and would not address the harms Appellants allege. For all these
reasons, the district court’s order denying issuance of a preliminary injunction on
this basis should be affirmed.
A.

Background: The Coastal Commission Has Only Limited
Approval Authority Over Local Legislation

Under California law, the authority to regulate land use flows from the
constitutional police power: “A county or city may make and enforce within its
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict
with general laws.” Cal. Const., Art. XI, §7. “Conflicts exist if the ordinance
duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either
expressly or by legislative implication.” Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, 7
Cal.4th 725, 747 (1994) (citations omitted). “[W]hen local government regulates in
an area over which it traditionally has exercised control, such as the location of
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particular land uses, California courts will presume, absent a clear indication of
preemptive intent from the Legislature, that such regulation is not preempted by
state statute.” Big Creek Lumber Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149
(2006) (citing IT Corp. v. Solano County Bd. of Supervisors, 1 Cal.4th 81, 93
(1991)).
The California Legislature has expressed its intent to retain the maximum
degree of local control over land use. See, e.g., Gov. Code §§65800, 65802; IT
Corp., 1 Cal.4th at 89. The Coastal Act itself expressly preserves the constitutional
police power of municipalities absent a clear conflict with the Act’s explicit terms.
See CPRC §30005(a), (b). The California Supreme Court has held that “the
wording of the Coastal Act does not suggest preemption of local planning by the
state; rather, under the language of section 30005, local governments have the
authority to zone land to fit any of the acceptable uses under the policies of the act
and have the discretion to be more restrictive than the Act.” Conway v. City of
Imperial Beach, 52 Cal.App.4th 78, 85 (1997) (citing Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal.3d
561, 572–573 (1984)).
The Coastal Act grants the Commission authority to certify LUPs, which are
policy documents “showing the land uses to be permitted in the Coastal Zone and
continuing policies for carrying out the goals of the Coastal Act.” ER-721; see also
CPRC §§30108.5, 30512, 30512.2. Santa Monica has a certified LUP. ER-708-
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789. The Commission has authority to review and approve amendments to this
LUP. See CPRC §30512(c).
The Coastal Commission has not yet certified any implementing zoning or
other land use ordinances (which would constitute the additional components of an
LCP, see CPRC §30108.6), and as a result Santa Monica does not have a certified
LCP. ER-238, 243; see 70 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 220, 1987 WL 247254 at *2 (Sep.
10, 1987) (“AG Op”) (“city may have a certified LUP for its coastal zone without a
certified LCP”).
As noted above, where a city has submitted implementing ordinances as part
of its LCP certification process, or where a city seeks to amend implementing
ordinances that are part of a previously certified LCP, the Commission may review
and certify or reject and request modifications to those implementing ordinances.
See CPRC §§30513; 30514(a); Douda v. California Coastal Com’n, 159
Cal.App.4th 1181, 1192 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Once an LCP is certified, any
amendments thereto (including any amendments to any implementing ordinances
that make up the certified LCP) are effective only if and when the Coastal
Commission certifies them. See CPRC §30514(a), (b), (e).
These limited powers are the extent of the Commission’s relevant authority
to review and approve City zoning and other land use ordinances that apply in the
City’s Coastal Zone. See Ibarra, 182 Cal.App.3d at 696.
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B.

Procedurally, the Ordinance Is Not Subject to Coastal
Commission Approval
1.

The Ordinance is not an amendment to the City’s LUP

Appellants contend that the Ordinance constitutes an unauthorized
“amendment” to the City’s certified LUP. AOB-55-56. They do not, however,
contend that the Ordinance directly amends any provision of the LUP. Instead,
they argue, the Ordinance worked an effective amendment to the LUP because it
seeks to impose in the Coastal Zone “further conditions, restrictions or limitations”
on land use that “conflict” with the Coastal Act or with the provisions of the City’s
certified LUP. AOB-55-56. At the time its LUP was certified, however, Santa
Monica’s permissive zoning scheme did not expressly permit, and as a result under
well-settled principles of California land use law prohibited, any short-term rentals.
See Urgent Care Medical Services v. City of Pasadena, 21 Cal.App.5th 1086
(2018) (permissive zoning is valid method of prohibiting marijuana dispensaries);
City of Corona v. Naulls, 166 Cal.App.4th 418 (2008) (“where a particular use of
land is not expressly enumerated in a city’s municipal code as constituting a
permissible use, it follows that such use is impermissible”) (emphasis in original).
As the record demonstrates, short-term rentals have not been a permitted use, and
thus have been prohibited, in every residential zoning district in Santa Monica
since at least 1988. ER-855-873 (1988 Zoning Ordinance Permitted Uses); ER47
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942-951 (Amended Zoning Ordinance); ER-984-1039 (current Zoning Ordinance).
Appellants contend that despite this clear record, home sharing was actually
permitted throughout Santa Monica prior to the Ordinance, and that the Ordinance
therefore constitutes a new restriction on use, inconsistent with the LUP, that is an
effective amendment to that LUP requiring Commission approval. In support,
Appellants make four arguments.
First, Appellants rely on a California Attorney General Opinion, which they
contend requires Commission review whenever a city seeks to impose further
conditions, restrictions, or limitations on land use in the Coastal Zone, if the
changes conflict with any certified LUP. AOB-at 56. In the cited opinion, the
Attorney General concluded that “local action [including an ordinance] which
prohibits a use of land in the coastal zone which is authorized by a certified LCP or
LUP ‘amends’ such certified LCP or LUP . . . and therefore does not become
effective until it is certified by the Commission.” AG Op 1987 WL 247254 at *6.
This conclusion has no application here because the LUP did not itself authorize
short-term rentals. Indeed, the LUP, as written, neither promotes nor expressly
permits short-term rentals. ER-708-788. Even assuming that prior to the Ordinance
the City’s zoning ordinances authorized short-term rentals (which, as discussed
above, they did not), the Ordinance would amend those zoning ordinances, not the
LUP, which did not even mention short-term rentals. Moreover, as discussed
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above, at the time the LUP was certified, the City’s permissive zoning scheme
prohibited short-term rentals, meaning that the Ordinance did not prohibit any land
use not already prohibited by zoning ordinances in effect at the time of the LUP’s
certification. Finally, because the Ordinance’s limits on short-term rentals serve to
decrease the removal of residential housing, including affordable housing, they are
consistent with the stated LUP goal to encourage “preservation of low and
moderate income housing within the Coastal Zone.” ER-772.
Second, Appellants rely on a letter in which a Commission staff member
states that the Commission “has interpreted local zoning ordinances in a broad
fashion and found that vacation rentals are a form of residential use, permitted by
right, in any residentially zoned area unless such uses are specifically prohibited or
otherwise restricted.” AOB-55 (citing ER-289). This letter is not binding on this
Court, nor would it be afforded deference by the California courts. See, e.g.,
Harlick v. Blue Shield of California, 686 F.3d 699, 716–17 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“Positions taken by an agency for purposes of litigation ordinarily receive little
deference under California law.”); Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 19 Cal.4th 1, 7-8 (1998) (“Considered alone and apart from the
context and circumstances that produce them, agency interpretations are not
binding or necessarily even authoritative.”). The letter is also not persuasive. It
cites no legal authority to support its assertion, which conflicts both with the line of
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California cases discussed above affirming that permissive zoning schemes
implement actual prohibitions and with the City’s interpretation of its own zoning
ordinances, which, as discussed below, is entitled to deference.
Third, Appellants contend “the record shows that properties historically
were available for short-term rentals in Santa Monica. AOB-56 (citing ER1815).
They cite a transcription of a portion of the April 28, 2015 City Council meeting at
which the Ordinance was considered, which does not support this contention. To
the contrary, the excerpt includes a City staff member confirming a Council
member’s statements that Santa Monica’s zoning laws “prohibited short-term
rentals of 30 days or less across the board” and that “to the extent we’re now
allowing this home sharing option, in a way, we are liberalizing our regulations
about short-term stays.” ER-1815. This is consistent with the staff report submitted
in support of the Ordinance and the findings contained in the Ordinance, which
reference preservation of “the City’s prohibition on vacation rentals” and new
authorization of “home-sharing.” ER-30, 1058, 1062 The City’s interpretation of
its own zoning ordinances is entitled to deference. MHC Operating Limited
Partnership v. City of San Jose, 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 219 (2003).
Finally, Appellants point to the absence from the record of “evidence of any
action to prevent, stop, or punish a resident from offering their home for a shortterm rental before” implementation of the Ordinance. AOB-at 56-57. The district
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court noted the absence of any such evidence, but correctly, given the record
otherwise establishing the City’s pre-existing longstanding ban on short term
rentals, held that Appellants had not “demonstrated a likelihood of success” on
their claim that the Ordinance amended the LUP. Concurrently with this brief, the
City is submitting a request for judicial notice containing both administrative
citations and a criminal complaint that demonstrate the City’s efforts to enforce the
ban on short-term rentals in place prior to passage of the Ordinance. See Exhibits A
and B to motion for judicial notice. These enforcement efforts confirm that the
Ordinance did not amend the LUP, either expressly or in effect. A California
Superior Court decision has reached the same conclusion. See Hayek v. City of
Santa Monica, No. 17STLC02007 (LA Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 2018)(unpublished);
(Ordinance is “not an unauthorized amendment to [the] City’s LUP”) (Opinion at
9). 17
2.

The Ordinance does not constitute development subject to
Coastal Commission approval

Because Santa Monica does not have a certified LCP, the Coastal
Commission retains authority to issue, and must approve, all CDPs for

The unpublished opinion in Hayek is Exhibit C to a concurrently-filed
motion for judicial notice.
17
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development within the City’s Coastal Zone. See CPRC §30600(c). Appellants
argue that the Ordinance “constitutes ‘development’ and therefore requires a CDP
from the Commission.” AOB-at 57.
Neither the text of the Coastal Act nor a single reported case in almost a half
century of Coastal Act litigation supports this position. California state court
decisions have strongly suggested that a municipal ordinance is not “development”
under the Coastal Act, and thus not subject to Commission review. See, e.g., City
of Dana Point v. California Coastal Commission, 217 Cal.App.4th 170, 188-193,
205-09 (2013) (Commission had no jurisdiction to review municipal ordinance but
could take actions against actual developments -- e.g. gates limiting beach access
and implementation of time limits for beach access -- authorized by ordinance that
were inconsistent with Coastal Act and city’s LUP).
Consistent with this longstanding law, the California Court of Appeal
recently considered and rejected the argument that municipal ordinances are
generally subject to Commission review outside the LCP certification process. In a
case involving a Coastal Act challenge to a Hermosa Beach ordinance prohibiting
short-term rentals in residential districts, the court upheld the ordinance, finding
that it “was enacted pursuant to the City’s police power and did not fall under the
auspices of the Coastal Commission.” Johnston v. City of Hermosa Beach, No.
B278424, 2018 WL 458920 at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2018) (unpublished),
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review denied (Apr. 11, 2018). Similarly, in Hayek, a California Superior Court
determined that the Ordinance “is not a development permit and the Commission’s
authority does not extend to approving or rejecting general laws adopted by cities.”
Opinion at 9.
Appellants rely (AOB-58) on a December 6, 2016, letter signed by the thenChair of the Coastal Commission that states “regulation of short-term/vacation
rentals . . . constitutes development.” ER-227. As discussed above, this letter does
not bind this Court. See, Harlick, 686 F.3d at 716–17; Yamaha, 19 Cal. 4th at 7-8.
Nor is it persuasive. It contains no citation to legal authority to support this
assertion, and is contrary to the approach of Dana Point, discussed above.
The additional cases cited by Appellant address private action, not municipal
legislation, and are not on point here. See Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores
Community Association, 21 Cal.App.5th 896, 901 (2018) (short-term rental
(“STR”) bans are “a matter for the City and Coastal Commission” and “may not be
regulated by private actors”); Surfrider Foundation v. Martins Beach 1, LLC, 14
Cal.App.5th 238, 249-55 (2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-1198 (U.S. Feb. 26,
2018) (private parties “conduct in closing public access to Martins Beach [through
erection of beach closure signs and permanent closure of existing gate] constituted
‘development’ requiring a CDP”); Gualala Festivals Comm. v. California Coastal
Comm’n, 183 Cal.App.4th 60, 67-70 (2010) (private party required to obtain CDP
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for fireworks display over coastal estuary). The distinction between private entities
and local governments is a critical one. Private actors are not empowered to
regulate land use as the City is, under both the California Constitution (Art. XI. §7)
and the Coastal Act (CPRC §30005(a), (b)). These cases therefore do not address
the issue here, whether a City’s municipal ordinance constitutes “development”
requiring Coastal Commission approval. Other California cases make clear that it
does not. The district court did not err in finding that Appellants failed to meet
“their burden to demonstrate a likelihood of success on this issue.” ER-8.
3.

The Ordinance Is Substantively Consistent With the
Coastal Act

The Ordinance reflects a balancing of interests consistent with the Coastal
Act: it liberalized a longstanding prohibition on short-term rentals to authorize
commercial home sharing, thereby promoting access to the coast, see CPRC
§30210, while protecting the availability and affordability of housing in Santa
Monica, see id. §30604 (f), (g) (directing Commission to “encourage housing
opportunities for persons of low and moderate income”). See also Cal. Gov’t Code
§65590 (laws authorizing and encouraging moderate and low-income housing
protections apply within Coastal Zone); ER-772 (“Santa Monica LUP shall
encourage the preservation of low- and moderate-income housing within the
Coastal Zone consistent with the Coastal Act policies contained herein”). The
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Ordinance is not, as Appellants would label it, a “blanket vacation rental ban” of
the type that the Commission has rejected when reviewing proposed amendments
to zoning ordinances constituting part of a certified LCP. See AOB-54; ER-249-51
(noting Commission actions rejecting certain proposed prohibitions of short-term
rentals, and approving, sometimes with requested modifications, certain proposed
restrictions on short-term rentals).
Commission staff reports on proposed amendments to certified LCPs
seeking to limit previously authorized short-term lodgings (“STLs”) recognize that
recent surges in STLs pose complex policy questions that may be answered in
different ways depending on particular “applicable community and area specific
factors.” ER-279. Commission staff has recognized, for example, city concerns
with “STL rentals causing problems (e.g. noise, disorderly conduct, traffic
congestion, excessive trash, etc.) that could negatively impact residents and
communities, reducing the long-term rental housing stock, and unduly burdening
City services.” ER-265, 271, 278-79.18
The Ordinance, which liberalized Santa Monica’s long-standing prohibition
on all short-term rentals in favor of permitting home-sharing (subject to certain

The views of Commission staff are not binding, and the proposed
amendments under discussion related to changes to implementing ordinances that
were part of certified LCPs. As discussed above, the City does not have a certified
LCP.
18
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limitations) throughout Santa Monica reflects just such a balancing of interests
premised on Santa Monica’s particular circumstances. As such, it does not
substantively conflict with the Coastal Act.
C.

An Injunction Based On Appellants’ Coastal Act Claim Will Not
Provide The Relief They Seek

This Court should affirm the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to
enjoin the Ordinance because Appellants cannot prevail on their Coastal Act claim.
Even if Appellants presented a more persuasive claim, an injunction on this ground
would apply to only the 18 percent of Santa Monica that lies within the coastal
zone and would revert the City to its previous complete prohibition on short-term
rentals, in place before the City Council adopted the Ordinance.
IV.

THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
FAVOR THE DISTRICT COURT’S DENIAL OF A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
The balance of hardships and the public interest strongly favor the City and

support the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The district court did
not address these factors, finding that a preliminary injunction should be denied
because Appellants failed to meet their burden of proving a likelihood of success
on the merits of any their claims. ER-9, 11, 12; Compare, Am. Trucking
Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 2009)
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(reaching harms analysis only after concluding “it is likely that many of [the
challenged] provisions are preempted.”).
Santa Monica’s elected City Council unanimously concluded that the
Ordinance serves the public’s interest. ER-1585-87. Courts generally defer to such
legislative findings of public interest. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32
(1954). Even putting deference aside, it is clear that California’s and Santa
Monica’s housing crisis is real, and the impacts of rampant, unchecked short-term
rentals are documented. ER-1405, 1410, 1411-1419. The Ordinance
unquestionably serves to protect diminishing affordable housing stock, preserve
residential communities, and facilitate coastal access, all via reasonable
regulations.
Public interest is also served by courts ensuring prompt implementation of
duly adopted legislation. Absent a clear showing that laws are unconstitutional, it
is in the public interest to ensure that the City’s carefully crafted and duly passed
laws are timely implemented. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315, 318 (1943).
The balance of hardships also tips heavily in the City’s favor. An injunction
would allow Appellants to continue to profit from Ordinance-violating short-term
rentals in Santa Monica, while simultaneously encouraging landlords to take
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affordable and rent-controlled housing off the market, likely never to return. ER1411. Enforcement of the Ordinance, by contrast, will not irreparably harm
Appellants -- they lose only money derived from rentals that violate the Ordinance.
See Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d
1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980) (“monetary injury is not normally considered
irreparable.”). Appellants have demonstrated their ability to continue operations
under a similar regulatory scheme -- they have been operating under an almost
identical ordinance in San Francisco for almost a year now, and they have not gone
bankrupt, nor has the internet been irreparably harmed. Compliance with the
Ordinance is made simpler by the City’s posting of its registry of licensed homeshare properties on line and the City has committed to work with Appellants to
facilitate compliance with the Ordinance. ER-68.

///

///
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CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the district
court’s denial of Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

Dated: May 16, 2018

Respectfully submitted,
LANE DILG
City Attorney
By:

/s/ Michael R. Cobden
MICHAEL R. COBDEN

Attorneys for Appellee
City of Santa Monica
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
City of Santa Monica is not aware of any related cases that are currently
pending in this Court.
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